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Many health care providers and policy makers believe that health care financing systems fail to reward high-quality care. In
recent years, federal and private payers have begun to promote pay for performance, or value-based purchasing, initiatives to
raise the quality of care. This report describes conceptual issues in the design and implementation of pay for performance for
chronic kidney disease and ESRD care. It also considers the implications of recent ESRD payment policy changes on the
broader goals of pay for performance. Congressionally mandated bundle payment demonstration for dialysis, newly imple-
mented case-mix adjustment of the composite rate, and G codes for the monthly capitation payment are important opportu-
nities to understand facility and provider behavior with particular attention to patient selection and treatment practices.
Well-designed payment systems will reward quality care for patients while maintaining appropriate accountability and
fairness for health care providers.
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ealth care financing systems, which were created to
ensure payment for services, traditionally lacked in-
centives to improve the quality of care. In a land-
mark report, the Institute of Medicine encouraged private and
public purchasers of care to “examine their current payment
methods to remove barriers that impede quality improvement
and to build stronger incentives for quality enhancement” (1).
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has
recommended that Medicare revise its payment methods to
include financial incentives for quality improvement (2). In
testimony to Congress, MedPAC Executive Director Mark
Miller stated, “Medicare is ready to implement pay for perfor-
mance as a national program, and differentiating among pro-
viders based on quality is an important first step toward pur-
chasing the best care for beneficiaries and assuring the future of
the program” (3). In hopes of stimulating quality improvement,
several governmental organizations have placed new emphasis
on aligning financial incentives with quality through pay for
performance (P4P), or value-based purchasing, initiatives.
The impetus for adoption of P4P programs has been the unre-
mitting rise in health care costs, along with growing recognition
that the quality of care delivered in the United States falls well
short of expectations. Health care expenditures in the United
States currently constitute 15% of the gross domestic product and
are expected to rise through this decade (4). Federal government
concerns over cost can only heighten as the aging of the “baby
boomer” generation (people born between 1946 and 1964) swells
the number of Medicare beneficiaries. Employers are struggling to
compete in the global marketplace as health care expenses take up
an increasing proportion of the costs of doing business. Despite
high expenditures, the current health care system not only fails to
provide patients with recommended care consistently but often
delivers harmful care (5,6).
With its long history of quality assurance and quality im-
provement initiatives, the ESRD program has served as a model
for innovation in the financing and delivery of care. The ESRD
Clinical Performance Measures Project, the National Vascular
Access Improvement Initiative, and the ESRD Managed Care
Demonstration Project have led to the development of metrics
for quality and have demonstrated focused improvements in
the care of patients with ESRD.
In this report, we describe conceptual issues in the design
and implementation of P4P for chronic kidney disease (CKD)
and ESRD care. In addition, we consider the implications of
recently implemented and proposed payment policy changes
on the broader goals of P4P.
Medicare Modernization Act
Since its adoption in 1973, the Medicare ESRD program has
grown from 7000 patients with ESRD needing dialysis treat-
ment to more than 400,000 patients with ESRD, more than
350,000 of whom require dialysis (7). The dialysis market has
also evolved with initial growth of independent dialysis facil-
ities and more recent consolidation of the dialysis industry.
Now a small number of predominantly for-profit large dialysis
organizations control most of the dialysis services market. De-
spite the growth of the ESRD program and seismic shifts in the
dialysis market, methods of payment have been until recently
largely unchanged.
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providers for a specified bundle of services at a flat fee known
as the composite rate. This payment structure for the Medicare
is resource based (on a per-service basis), rewarding increased
volume even if that service is inefficient or ineffective. Histor-
ically, reimbursement policies have not adjusted the level of
payment for outcomes, efficiency, or any specific metrics of
quality. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) includes provisions de-
signed to change fundamentally the structure of the ESRD
financing system. First, it requires a basic case-mix–adjusted
prospective payment system for dialysis patients. Second, it
mandates the design of a demonstration project for a broader
bundled payment system that includes all injectable drugs and
laboratory tests.
Evidence Base for P4P
The evidence base for P4P in medicine is sparse with mixed
results (Table 1). Using modest financial incentives in a Med-
icaid health maintenance organization and low-income urban
population, Hillman and colleagues (8–10) demonstrated no
effect on cancer screening rates and pediatric preventive care.
Other studies have reported modest success with targeted fi-
nancial incentives. For example, an incentive amounting to
$0.80 to $1.60 per vaccination led to a 10.3% increase in influ-
enza immunization rates in a Medicare population (11). In
another study, performance bonuses ranging from $5000 to
$10,000 per physician per year led to a 14% increase in docu-
mentation of patients’ smoking status and a 6% increase in
smoking cessation counseling in a health maintenance organi-
zation setting (12). Differences in the success of incentives in
these studies may be explained by the type of quality measure
evaluated, the size of incentives, or characteristics of the study
populations (e.g., socioeconomic). More recently, Rosenthal et
al. (13) evaluated a P4P program initiated by a large health plan
and demonstrated that P4P bonus payments representing ap-
proximately 5% of the professional capitation paid by the plan
and 0.8% of the groups’ overall revenue had no effect on
improving mammography rates or glycosylated hemoglobin
testing and only a modest effect on augmenting cervical cancer
screening. These authors concluded that paying physicians to
achieve a fixed performance target may produce little incre-
mental benefit in quality and serves only to rewards those with
higher performance at baseline. Taken together, the consider-
able heterogeneity in study design, incentive size, and type of
performance targets in published studies that have evaluated
P4P has significantly limited the generalizability of previously
published work.
Despite a paucity of data linking P4P to measured outcomes,
the number of P4P programs in the United States has grown
dramatically. In 2003, Rosenthal et al. (14) identified 31 sponsors
of P4P initiatives. Most were directed at hospitals. These au-
thors found that most programs rewarded achievement of an
absolute target (i.e., quality assurance) rather than rewarding
change directly. More recent estimates suggest that there are
more than 100 P4P initiatives in various stages of development.
Although a recent systematic review of the literature noted
some positive effects of financial incentives at the physician
level and the provider groups level, the authors cautioned that
financial incentives can have unintended negative effects on
quality of care (15). P4P programs aimed at family practitioners
in Britain’s National Health Service showed significant im-
provement in quality targets, but there was some evidence of
gaming the system by excluding certain groups of patients (16).
These findings suggest that it will be necessary not only to
monitor performance but also to ensure continued access for
the most complex, costly patients (17).
Implementation Challenges
Researchers, policy makers, and health care managers have
detailed the considerable challenges in developing P4P pro-
grams in health care (18–20). The design and implementation of
P4P for the CKD and ESRD populations pose specific oppor-
tunities and challenges. Young et al. (21) described a useful
conceptual framework for the design and implementation of
P4P programs organized around five dimensions: (1) Provider
awareness of quality incentives, (2) size and structure of incen-
tives, (3) clinical relevance of quality targets, (4) accountability
for quality targets, and (5) fairness of pay-for-quality programs.
Table 2 examines features of the ESRD program across these
dimensions.
Specific features of the ESRD financing and delivery system
make it amenable to P4P. The ESRD program has significant
experience in quality measurement and improvement pro-
grams that have been instrumental in the development of a core
set of clinical performance measures that are widely recognized
and accepted by the nephrology community. The ESRD pro-
gram has an established data collection infrastructure, which
includes the Standardized Information Management System
that links the 18 ESRD Networks with the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the US Renal Data System. In
2003, CMS introduced a new system, VISION, to encourage
electronic entry and transmission of facility-level data to the
ESRD Network, but overall use of this system has been low. To
create a more robust information database, CMS should en-
courage universal adoption of the VISION data architecture
after it has been adequately tested. Facility-level information
should be integrated with existing data to create actionable
performance reports and provide timely feedback. Some P4P
programs have used financial incentives to encourage the adop-
tion of information technology by individual practitioners
within their offices. P4P initiatives can provide a unique op-
portunity to encourage large-scale implementation of informa-
tion technology in outpatient nephrology practices. Clinical
information systems designed for enhanced interoperability
can provide much needed data on CKD care and serve as an
important link as patients transition to ESRD.
As the major payer for ESRD care, CMS will determine the
size and structure of financial incentives. CMS and MedPAC
have emphasized budget neutrality and a shared belief that
linking quality to payment should not require additional Medi-
care funding. Budget neutrality implies that instead of putting
more money into the system, the ESRD program will shift
existing resources. Other P4P experiences suggest that financial
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to produce meaningful change. The current reimbursement
structure and payer mix gives CMS leverage to implement P4P
incentives and effect change among ESRD providers. In addi-
tion, private insurers, who have growing numbers of patients
with ESRD and are carrying an increasing financial burden of
ESRD care, are also likely to develop CKD- and ESRD-specific
P4P programs.
Financial incentives can be directed at either the individual
nephrologist or physician group or at the level of the dialysis
facility. Currently, much of nephrology practice occurs within
medical groups rather than solo practices. Multiple nephrolo-
gists may be involved in the care of any patient. Furthermore,
nonphysician care providers (e.g., nurse practitioners, physician
assistants) are increasingly used in the care of dialysis patients
and may see patients as often as the primary nephrologists.
Dialysis facilities have nurses, technicians, dieticians, social
workers, and physicians who play important roles in patient
care. In addition, dialysis patients typically have multiple co-
morbid conditions for which they are seen by other providers,
including cardiologists, endocrinologists, vascular surgeons,
and interventional radiologists.
Incentives that target individual providers promote meeting
performance targets, but they fail to account for the multidis-
ciplinary nature of nephrology care. Pham et al. (22) described
the care patterns of 1.79 million Medicare beneficiaries and
found that care is highly dispersed among many physicians.
The average patient sees two primary care physicians and five
specialists, working in a median of four practices, during the
course of a year. For patients with chronic conditions, care
dispersion was even more pronounced with greater number of
physicians and practices involved in each patient’s care. Pay-
ment systems that assign accountability for care across various
settings and extended periods of time will be best suited to
promote care coordination, efficiency, and achievement of clin-
ical performance goals (23).
Incentives at the dialysis facility level or at the organizational
level may be better able to stimulate structural changes in the
Table 2. Key dimensions of design and implementation of P4P
a
Dimension Key Issues Implications for ESRD
Awareness of quality
incentives
Provider familiarity
Communication strategy
Nephrologists have considerable
experience with proposed clinical
performance measures.
Size and structure of
financial incentives
Dollar amount for incentives
Bonus versus fee schedule versus
withhold
Budget neutrality requirement will
result in redistribution of existing
resources with winners and losers.
Renal Physician’s Association has
lobbied strongly against withhold
arrangement.
Clinical relevance of
quality targets
Linking structural and process
measures to outcomes
Measurement reliability and data
integrity
Timely feedback
Facility-level mortality continues to
vary significantly despite
improvements in dialysis adequacy
and anemia process measures.
Current data collection systems may
not be able to provide real-time
feedback on performance.
Accountability for
quality targets
Matching accountability with control
Patient compliance issues
Many areas of ESRD care are
multidisciplinary in nature; it is
difficult to assign accountability (e.g.,
failed vascular access).
Some performance measures depend on
adherence to medications and dietary
recommendations (e.g., phosphate
binders).
Fairness of pay for
performance
programs
Definition of quality target: Threshold
value versus percentage improvement
Case-mix adjustment
Proposed ESRD bundled payment will
consider both meeting absolute
targets and improvement over time.
Unclear whether current case-mix
adjustment based only on age and
body mass index adequately
identifies patients who are sicker.
aAdapted from reference (21).
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nology). In addition, it will be difficult to evaluate and perform
adequate case-mix adjustment for individual physicians who
take care of a small number of dialysis patients. Physician
groups and dialysis facilities are more likely to have enough
patients to produce statistically meaningful results.
Linking payment to quality within a single setting does not
necessarily enhance coordination across settings. Alignment of
incentives for dialysis facilities, nephrologists, and other prac-
titioners can stimulate much needed collaboration and coordi-
nation among care providers. Incentive systems that are per-
ceived to be unfair—paying too much for some patients, paying
too little for others, or penalizing providers for the poor care of
others—may result in “cherry picking” behavior by providers
and facilities. Efforts to recruit patients with favorable risk
profiles may have the deleterious effect of limiting access of the
most vulnerable patient groups.
Recent Policy Changes
Recent developments in the financing of ESRD care parallel
the broader emphasis on payment for quality. Incentives cre-
ated by reimbursement policy changes are sometimes difficult
to anticipate and may affect the quality of care delivered to
patients. In this section, we detail three recent changes in ESRD
payment policy that are either fully implemented or in devel-
opment. Although none of these policies reflects P4P in the
traditional sense, they provide insight into how economic in-
centives might affect provider behavior, and lessons learned
from their implementation may influence the design of future
P4P programs for ESRD.
Increasing Physician Contact
In January 2004, Medicare revised its payment rules with a
system that uses temporary “G” codes to establish different
payments for physician services. The monthly capitation pay-
ment was revised to account for the number of provider–
dialysis patient interactions per month. When physicians are
reimbursed on a capitated basis, there is less financial incentive
to spend time with patients than under fee-for-service. The goal
of shifting from a capitated to a fee-for-service payment based
on visit frequency was to encourage more frequent visits
among dialysis patients and their nephrologists. This goal was
motivated by previous work suggesting that dialysis-related
outcomes are improved by more frequent physician contact
(24). An analysis of the 5-yr survival of 4661 patients with ESRD
by Held et al. (24) showed that mortality was directly correlated
with physician staffing. An analysis of the Dialysis Outcomes
and Practice Patterns Study (DOPPS) data also suggested that
mortality risk was slightly lower at dialysis facilities where
physicians saw patients more frequently (25). In addition, pro-
fessional societies such as the Renal Physicians Association and
the American Society of Nephrology developed a position pa-
per that recommended weekly nephrologist visits for all pa-
tients who have ESRD and are treated with in-center hemodi-
alysis (26).
However, more recently published data suggest that more
frequent nephrologist visits are not necessarily associated with
better outcomes. Plantinga et al. (27) showed that survival,
hospitalization rates, quality of life, and subjective ratings of
care were not influenced by the frequency of physician visits on
dialysis. After implementation in January 2004 of the new
policy to encourage more frequent nephrologists visits, Mentari
et al. (28) designed a study to determine the influence of this
policy change. These authors found that the number of visits
per patient-month increased from 1.52 before to 3.14 after (P 
0.001) and that the percentage of patients with no nephrologist
visits per patient-month decreased from 16.6% before to 4.6%
after (P  0.001). However, there were no clinically important
changes in Kt/Vurea, serum concentrations of albumin, hemo-
globin, phosphorus and calcium, hemodialysis catheter use,
ultrafiltration volume, the number of shortened or skipped
treatments, hospital admissions, hospitalization days, self-re-
ported health-related quality of life, and patient satisfaction, a
diverse collection of factors considered proxies for the quality
of hemodialysis care. To the extent that a patient’s dialysis
experience might be improved by increased interaction with his
or her nephrologist, the move to create a minimum frequency
for direct nephrologist–dialysis patient contact was successful.
However, so far, the policy has not been shown to have a
meaningful effect on objective dimensions of quality and likely
resulted in greater expenditures for physician services.
Case-Mix Adjustment
A key provision of the MMA was the development of a
case-mix–adjusted prospective payment system for a limited
number of patient characteristics that was adjusted by geo-
graphic index for dialysis payments. To establish the case-mix
rates, the CMS contracted with the Kidney Epidemiology and
Cost Center to construct models based on 2000 to 2002 national
data for each dialysis provider using facility cost reports and
data from the CMS Medical Evidence (2728) form. From this
model, CMS adopted a case-mix adjustment based on age and
body composition that took effect on April 1, 2005 (29,30).
Under the new case-mix adjustment system, Medicare mod-
ifies reimbursement on the basis of patient characteristics. Cor-
rection factors increase reimbursement for facilities that care for
younger and older individuals and for people of larger body
size (measured by body surface) and also adjust for people with
a very low body mass index (18.5 kg/m
2). Some observers
have argued that dialysis facilities, in response to the new
case-mix adjustment payment, may alter their patient recruit-
ment strategies and place the most vulnerable populations at
risk (31). Furthermore, the proposed risk adjustment identifies
patients who are costlier than average to dialyze but not the
patients for whom the facilities incur the highest cost. For
example, use of cost reports neglects that the costliest patients
are those who require prolonged hospitalization, resulting in
the assigned chairs’ remaining empty with no payment (32).
A case-mix adjustment that evaluates the intensity of inter-
ventions and acuity of patients, conversely, may lead to a more
equitable distribution of financial resources for ESRD care (33).
For example, a study that used a modified Charlson comorbid-
ity index to predict outcomes and costs in dialysis patients
demonstrated an 87% cost differential between providing care
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move toward a risk-adjusted composite rate must be accompa-
nied by close evaluation of its effect on patient recruitment,
treatment patterns, and quality of care. A well-designed case-
mix adjustment can provide a safeguard to ensure that provid-
ers do not turn away sicker patients or those who require more
complex care. The current system could provide a disincentive
to the care of black women (who tend to be lighter in weight
than men but unlikely to have a body mass index 18.5 kg/m
2)
and other people of average or smaller body size.
ESRD Bundled Payment Demonstration Project
A second important provision of the MMA was the require-
ment that the Secretary of Health and Human Services submit
a report on the design of a broader bundled payment system
that includes injectable drugs, laboratory tests, and other items
that currently are excluded from the outpatient bundle. On the
basis of this report, there is a plan to start a 3-yr bundling
demonstration, which still has not begun. This fee-for-service
demonstration will cover most separately billed items and ser-
vices provided by dialysis facilities (including erythropoiesis-
stimulating proteins) and will include a P4P component.
The Advisory Board for the Bundled Payment Demonstration
has identified three major components to the project: (1) Definition
of the bundle of services for which payment will be made and
related consolidated billing rules; (2) a prospective payment sys-
tem that bundles services, including case-mix adjustment; and (3)
an approach to implementing P4P for both the bundled services
and, more broadly, the management of ESRD (35).
The proposed bundle will include nearly all services pro-
vided by the dialysis facility. These include composite rate
services, nearly all drugs administered by the dialysis facility,
laboratory tests ordered by practitioners who oversee patient
care in the dialysis facility, blood and blood products admin-
istered in the dialysis facility, and medical/surgical supply
items. Independent dialysis facilities may find bundling less
attractive than will facilities that are owned by large for-profit
chains that benefit from significant economies of scale in pur-
chasing supplies from vendors and negotiated discounts with
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. Moreover, these
changes in payment rules may provide a disincentive for dial-
ysis facilities to accept patients who are discharged from the
hospital and require high-cost, labor-intensive care (e.g., trans-
fusions, treatment of catheter-associated infections with intra-
venous antibiotics). These disincentives may result in less
timely discharge from hospitals, increased hospital stays, and a
net increase in expenditures.
The second component, a prospective payment system, will
be divided into a composite rate with a basic case-mix adjust-
ment and a separate bundled add-on with a separate case-mix
adjustment. The inherent concern for providers with any pro-
spective payment system is the issue of adverse selection. Pre-
liminary reports on the design of the prospective payment
system suggest that CMS plans to implement either an outlier
policy under which additional payments are made for high-cost
patients or a stop-loss arrangement that limits the potential loss
for an individual facility (35).
Finally, the P4P component of the demonstration seems to be
the least developed. The stated goals of the project are to
reward improved quality; to encourage providers to manage
anemia more effectively and efficiently; and to align the incen-
tives across facilities, physicians, and other providers. The pro-
posed two-part design would include a “quality corridor” and
“shared savings” (35). The quality corridor approach, which is
focused on bundled services, withholds a fraction of payment
that can later be distributed on the basis of measures of dialysis
adequacy and quality of anemia management. Current plans
are to use multiple measures with emphasis on both meeting
benchmark targets and improvement. The second part is the
shared savings approach, which attempts to align incentives
and facilitate collaboration among dialysis facilities, nephrolo-
gists, and other providers. Using this approach, payment is
based on meeting performance measures (not yet defined) but
is also contingent on demonstrated savings.
Linking CKD to ESRD
If P4P is to become a major component of the reimbursement
structure for kidney disease, then its use cannot be limited to
ESRD. The growing burden of CKD represents a major public
health concern that requires significant improvement in detec-
tion, treatment, and outcome monitoring (36). Policy makers
will need to develop financing mechanisms that recognize the
importance of advanced-stage CKD care on the future resource
use and outcomes of patients with ESRD. Furthermore, the
predicted rise in the ESRD population and significant expendi-
tures related to these patients should provide sufficient impe-
tus to use incentives systems to manage and delay progression
of CKD.
Despite the availability of process measures and consensus
among physicians about which measures to target, there is
extensive evidence of suboptimal care for patients with CKD.
The deficiencies have been documented across a range of areas,
including hypertension management, vascular access place-
ment, transplantation referral, and preventive health services
(37–41). A retrospective analysis of the Third National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III) showed that
only 27% of patients with CKD had BP of 140/90 (37). Despite
clear evidence of the association of higher mortality rates with
the use of temporary and tunneled vascular catheter compared
with arteriovenous fistulas, few patients are adequately coun-
seled on vein preservation for fistula creation (38,39). Although
kidney transplantation is the preferred renal replacement solu-
tion because of improved survival, in 2000, only 22% of dialysis
patients who were younger than 70 yr were on a kidney trans-
plant list in the United States (40). Although the cost-effective-
ness of a variety of screening tools in the ESRD population has
been questioned, health maintenance care in the CKD popula-
tion is also inadequate with 27, 17, and 40% of patients in the
United States receiving the recommended frequency of mam-
mography, Papanicolaou smears, and prostate-specific antigen
screening respectively (41).
Early referral to a nephrologist has been shown to be associ-
ated with lower mortality rates after initiation of dialysis (42–
44). Despite this apparent benefit, a significant number of pa-
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important implications for P4P initiatives because providers
will be evaluated and paid on the basis of measures that can be
heavily influenced by the actions of previous providers. One
potential solution would be to defer the use of a P4P adjustment
for a period of time to treat the complications of CKD that may
have been suboptimally managed before initiation of dialysis
(20).
Current measures used for ESRD may not be adequate to
evaluate the quality of care for patients with stages 1 through 4
CKD. Whereas current recommendations for the treatment of
patients with ESRD are based on extensive evidence, less is
known about the epidemiology of pre-ESRD CKD. Large ob-
servational studies, such as the Chronic Renal Insufficiency
Cohort (CRIC) Study, aim to examine risk factors for progres-
sion of CKD and develop models to identify high-risk sub-
groups (45). Results from these studies may identify new pre-
dictors of disease progression and mortality that will not only
inform future intervention trials but also guide the develop-
ment of process measures that are linked to outcomes. For
example, one area of potential interest is cardiovascular disease
(CVD). CKD is strongly and independently associated with
CVD, even after adjustment for traditional cardiovascular risk
factors. The current National Kidney Foundation Kidney Dis-
ease Outcomes Quality Initiative (K/DOQI) guidelines note
that individuals with CKD are at increased risk for CVD and
that they should be considered in the “highest risk group” for
evaluation and treatment according to established guidelines
(46). Guidelines that lump all patients with significant risk
factors into a catch-all high-risk group will not adequately
distinguish the true differences that exist within this group.
Important opportunities for risk reduction will likely be
missed. For example, research may find that a patient with a
strong family history for CVD has a very different risk profile
than a patient with stage 4 CKD. Identification of specific risk
predictors for CKD progression and development of CVD
among patients with CKD may lead to targeted diagnostic and
therapeutic strategies.
Limited reimbursement for CKD within the current fee struc-
ture represents a significant barrier to the organizational
change and multidisciplinary collaboration that can lead to
improved outcomes. P4P programs that target nephrologists or
dialysis facilities and ignore other physicians (e.g., endocrinol-
ogists, cardiologists, vascular surgeons) and participating care-
givers including nurses, dieticians, social workers, and phar-
macists may fail to align incentives adequately across the
spectrum of care. Business experts have described this coordi-
nated care model as a care delivery value chain (47). Services
are organized around a medical condition and are tightly co-
ordinated “within an integrated structure designed for exper-
tise in the patient’s primary condition, rather than an ad hoc
structure involving uncoordinated specialists” (47).
The care delivery value chain for CKD and ESRD involves
different set of activities, but it also recognizes that there are
important links between CKD and ESRD, such as the timely
placement of vascular access, management of mineral metabo-
lism and anemia, and close monitoring of comorbidities. Dis-
ease management programs, successfully implemented in other
disease states, may be well suited to overcome the current
fragmentation of care (48). A systematic review that assessed
the clinical and economic effects of disease management in
patients with chronic diseases found marked improvements in
many processes and outcomes of care but no significant reduc-
tion in costs (49).
Conclusion
Previous experiences with changes in reimbursement policy
suggest that insufficient funding or poorly designed incentive
mechanisms can result in unintended and unwanted conse-
quences. With the recent rise of CMS-funded P4P initiatives
and the upcoming bundled payment demonstration, it is essen-
tial to use initial experiences with case-mix adjustment of the
composite rate and G codes for the monthly capitation payment
to understand facility and provider behavior with particular
attention to patient selection and treatment practices (50,51).
Dialysis providers face unique challenges as they balance
cost and quality of care for a disproportionately sick population
amid capitated reimbursement and increased government reg-
ulation. Although skepticism and concern that payment cuts
will be deeper is understandable, the potential to be rewarded
on the basis of performance should be embraced as we strive to
provide the highest quality care. Although P4P is in its forma-
tive stages, the nephrology community should resist the ten-
dency to accept these changes passively. Patient and provider
advocacy groups such as the Renal Physicians Association and
Kidney Care Partners have been particularly active in the de-
velopment of tools to measure performance; these organiza-
tions should remain engaged in the implementation of P4P.
Having treated patients with CKD and ESRD, nephrologists
can use their unique perspective to promote P4P plans that
align payment systems across the spectrum of kidney disease.
Finally, there is considerable need for progress on a research
agenda for studying financial incentives in health care. Com-
pared with other, more fragmented segments of the health care
market, dialysis facilities and nephrology practices provide a
unique setting for certain types of randomized, controlled tri-
als. They are also excellent settings for observational studies
with concurrent control groups. Additional research will be
needed to identify additional performance measures that are
strongly associated with mortality and to provide ongoing
assessment on how payment changes influence provider be-
havior.
Future P4P initiatives for the ESRD program should use a
mix of individual- and group/facility-level incentives that bal-
ance the need for clear lines of accountability with the ability to
ensure adequate risk sharing and sample sizes for performance
measurement. P4P programs should reward both top perform-
ers and those who show significant improvement in perfor-
mance by creating bonus payments for meeting absolute targets
as well as incremental improvements. Finally, providers should
receive larger payments to care for disadvantaged populations
or groups that are more costly to treat. Although adequate
case-mix adjustment can also discourage “cherry picking” be-
havior, it is important that P4P initiatives not further widen the
Clin J Am Soc Nephrol 2: 1087-1095, 2007 Rise of Pay for Performance 1093disparities in health care quality for these vulnerable patient
groups.
The effect of reimbursement policy on provider behavior and
quality is especially important in the dialysis industry. Reim-
bursement policies that do not adequately fund the provision of
dialysis itself yet fund other therapies that are used in dialysis
can have the perverse effects of limiting care for the sickest,
most vulnerable patients and promoting overuse of services or
drugs for which compensation is higher. Faced with the poten-
tial for erosion of the reimbursement rate and an aging dialysis
population with multiple comorbidities, dialysis providers face
decisions at the intersection of business practice and clinical
care. Well-designed payment systems will reward quality while
maintaining appropriate accountability and fairness for provid-
ers.
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